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Historically, local governments have been empowered to regulate the health, safety, welfare
and, more significantly, the morals of their citizens.
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"Perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly [defining obscenity].
But I know it when I see it."
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
Historically, local governments have been empowered to regulate the
health, safety, welfare and, more significantly, the morals of their citi-
zens. The exercise of these powers is subject to a standard of reasonable-
ness, except where there exists some threat to the exercise of
"fundamental rights" of those persons who are to be governed by the
regulations.
The courts have decided that the sale or distribution of materials
previously determined to be obscene is not a right protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
While there have been varying opinions regarding the precise defi-
nition of obscenity, this article will address the ability of local govern-
ments to regulate the distribution of those materials that have been
judicially determined to be obscene and the measures which may
properly be applied to those individuals who have previously been con-
victed of some offense relating to obscenity.
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In addition to utilizing the power to revoke occupational licenses
for infractions relating to obscenity, local authorities have sought to
circumvent the legal difficulties associated with the infringements upon
free speech by fashioning zoning regulations which are designed to con-
fine "adult entertainment" activities to specified geographical areas, to
disperse these activities throughout a wide geographical area, or to
abate these activities as nuisances.
Local governments have often imposed rules and procedures which
may be designed to frustrate the "adult entertainment" activities. These
procedures include background investigations of operators, officers and
employees of adult entertainment businesses; the taking of police photo-
graphs and fingerprints of employees; requiring that lists of names and
addresses of customers be maintained; and the strict (and sometimes
selective) enforcement of building and fire codes.
The judiciary has sought to balance the competing interests of
governments, which seek to regulate and proscribe a mode of conduct
and those citizens who seek to exercise their right of expression and their
freedom to earn a living. The result of the courts' judicious scrutiny has
been that cases involving the propriety of certain regulatory measures
have been decided, each on its own facts. As a result, there are few
precise guideposts for legislative bodies to follow.
In an effort to discover whether there exist consistent patterns of
legislation which appear to be a permissible exercise of the police power
in a manner designed to regulate the morals of the citizens, this article
will explore some of the enactments by local governments and the re-
view processes.
1. HISTORY
"Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indis-
putably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind throughout the
ages."' The interest in sexual matters was first "squarely presented" to
the United States Supreme Court in 1957,2 when it was called upon to
determine the permissibility of having local governmental bodies pro-
scribe the extent to which sexually-oriented materials may be sold, ad-
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
2. Id. The court did note that, in its previous opinions, it had always assumed that
obscenity was not protected by the "freedoms of speech and press." 354 U.S. at 481.
However, this was the first case actually holding that obscenity is not a constitutionally
protected area. 354 U.S. at 485.
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vertised or distributed to the public.
There have been early determinations that municipalities may
adopt ordinances which regulate the exhibition of obscene motion pic-
tures3 and the distribution of obscene literature as a valid exercise of
the police power. However, in these earlier cases, the concepts' of ob-
scenity were limited to whether a theatre operator should lose his license
for exhibiting a film relating to the repeal of a birth control law,' a
picture which portrayed in harrowing detail the capture and death of a
spy,5 or a certain picture dealing with the American Civil War recon-
striction period and having a tendency to stimulate class hatred.' Cur-
rent concern for regulation is motivated by a desire to limit the distribu-
tion of materials which explicitly depict sexual intercourse, fellatio,
cunnilingus, brutality, sodomy and, more recently, the depiction of the
foregoing activities by children, known as "kiddi-porn."
Inasmuch as the intensity of the sexual activity which is depicted
has increased over the years, the need for heightened emphasis upon the
regulation of morals by governments is apparent. Concurrently, how-
ever, the courts are reluctant to countenance a manner of regulation
which would infringe upon an individual's "fundamental rights." All
ideas having even the slightest social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion-have the full protection of the constitutional guaranties of free
speech and press, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests.7 The difficulty, from the view
of local governments, is that the "more important interests" have not
been precisely defined. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
O'Brien," held that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
(1) it is within the constitutional powers of the government; (2) it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the govern-
3. See, e.g., Brooks v. Birmingham, 32 F.2d 274 (N.D. Ala. 1929).
4. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. v. Bell, 100 Misc. 281, 167 N.Y.S. 124
(1917), affd, 179 App. Div. 928, 166 N.Y.S. 344 (1917). The film in question portrayed,
as a martyr, the confessed violator of a law forbidding the imparting of information
pertaining to birth control. The intent of the film's maker was, unquestionably, to argue
in favor of repealing the law. The court upheld the suspension of the theatre operator's
license under a city ordinance allowing same where such a film or play is "immoral,
indecent or against the public welfare." 167 N.Y.S. at 128.
5. City of Chicago v. Fox Films, 251 F. 883 (7th Cir. 1917).
6. Thayer Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 21 R.I. 117, 7 A.2d 682 (1939).
7. 354 U.S. at 484.
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.9 The Court
referred to "an important governmental interest," but failed to define
it. In the opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that "[tjwo members of the
Court steadfastly maintain that the first and fourteenth amendments
render society powerless to protect itself against the dissemination of
even the filthiest materials." 10 However, there is also a reluctance to
admit that the states are powerless to protect their citizens from expo-
sure to patently offensive materials. "The concepts involved are said to
be so elusive and the laws so inherently unenforceable without extrava-
gant expenditures of time and effort by enforcement officers and the
courts that basic reassessment is not only wise but essential."', The
Court believes that the "task of restructuring the obscenity laws lies
with those who pass, repeal and amend statutes and ordinances. "12
While the courts have had little difficulty in permitting the regula-
tion of those materials which are determined to be offensive to children
and non-consenting adults,' 3 the question of whether states and munici-
palities may regulate distribution to "consenting adults" is not so well
settled.
The United States Supreme Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton," announced that, even though it had often pointedly recognized
the high importance of states' interest in regulating the exposure of
obscene materials to juveniles and non-consenting adults, "this Court
has never declared these to be the only legitimate state interests permit-
ting regulation of obscene material." 5 The Court held, in particular,
"that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide
9. Id. at 377.
10. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 (1968). The "two
members" to whom Harlan is referring are Justices Douglas and Black, both of whom
set out this idea in their dissenting opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
508, and in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 482 (1966).
I1. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971).
12. Id.
13. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973). (Unsolicited offering of sexually
explicit books sent through the mails).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). (Where the court found that the first and
fourteenth amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with pornog-
raphy which might fall into the hands of children or offend the general public.)
14. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
15. Id. at 59.
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of commercialized obscenity . ". .. I' "These included the interest of the
public in the equality of life and the total community environment, the
tone of commerce in the great city centers, and possibly the public safety
itself. . that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene
material and crime."17
In distinguishing between an individual's private right to "expose
himself to indecency" and his demand for a right to obtain books and
pictures in the marketplace, the Court noted that to grant this right is
to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other
privacies.18
By its holding in Paris, the Court opened the door for local govern-
ments to regulate, pursuant to a recognized state interest and subject
to procedural safeguards, the distribution of obscene materials. Such a
right does invite the innovative and imaginative exercise of the power.
However, again the Court failed to provide standard to be applied. The
result has been that state and local governments have adopted certain
measures, the operators of "adult entertainment" establishments have
attacked these measures and the courts have treated each of the cases
separately, with no apparent emerging judicial policy regarding the par-
ameters within which the governments may regulate.
The courts of the state of Florida have already ruled upon such
issues as whether the seizure of certain motion pictures by municipal
officers and a subsequent court injunction against their showing consti-
tute a prohibited prior restraint"9 and whether a charging information
which tracks the language of the Florida obscenity statute 0 while specif-
ically naming the publication involved in a prosecution is "sufficient to
put the defendant on notice and prevent double jeopardy." 21 Thus far,
16. Id. at 57.
17. Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, (Hill-Link Minor-
ity Report) (1970).
18. Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy, The Case for Censorship, 22 THE PUB.
INTEREST 3 (Winter 1971) (emphasis added).
19. State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1972). The injunction was upheld as to certain seized films, although the court found
such a restraint could not be imposed against any showing which would occur outside
of Dade County, Florida, (the jurisdiction in which the court sat) as the circuit court
had ordered. In addition, the court held invalid those portions of the injunction which
prohibited the showing of "any motion picture which portrayed certain listed acts"
without reference to any seized or specific film. 258 So. 2d at 32.
20. § 847.011 FLA. STAT. (1977).
21. Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1977).
135]1Control of Adult EntertainmentI 3:1979
5
Knox and Klausner: Municipal Regulation Of "Adult Entertainment"- The Game Without R
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has
determined that vigorous enforcement of obscenity laws constitutes an
invalid restraint on first amendment rights if its purpose is to force a
sexually-oriented enterprise to cease doing business or to refrain from
dealing in presumably protected sexually-oriented materials. 2
2. PRIOR RESTRAINT-AN OVERVIEW
In attempting to regulate the distribution of printed or recorded
material based on its content, municipalities have found themselves
inexorably enmeshed in the doctrine of prior restraint. That is, a re-
straint on a form of speech before any actual expression occurs, with
an absence of judicial safeguards.23
The historical genesis of this doctrine is traced in Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson.2 In reversing a finding of public nuisance against an
anti-semitic publication, the Court quoted Blackstone z5 in holding that
liberty of the press consisted in laying "no previous restraints upon
publication. 126
Prior restraints on free speech are not, however, per se unconstitu-
tional. In Time Film Corp. v. Chicago," the Supreme Court refused to
strike down a section of a Chicago city ordinance requiring the submis-
sion of a film to a censor prior to its being exhibited.2 Although the
22. P.A.B., Inc. v. Stack, 440 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
23. Southeastern Publications, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Here, munic-
ipal authorities denied a promoter of theatrical productions the use of a municipal
theatre in which to present the rock musical "Hair," on the basis that the presentation
of such a show "would not be 'in the best interest of the community.'" Id. at 547-48.
The Supreme Court found such denial constituted a prior restraint because the munici-
pal authorities had denied "use of a forum in advance of actual expression." Id. at 553.
The Court further held that the municipal authorities violated the promoter's first
amendment right of free expression when they effected the prior restraint without imple-
menting "procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally
protected speech." Id. at 559.
24. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). In this landmark case, the United States Supreme
Court held that a state statute which prohibited, as a public nuisance, the publication
of a newspaper or periodical, imposed "an unconstitutional restraint upon publication."
Id. at 723.
25. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 151, 152
(1765). The full quote reads: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication." Id.
26. 283 U.S. at 715.
27. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
28. Id. at 46.
136
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Court admitted that the ordinance imposed a prior restraint, it indicated
that its ruling dealt solely with the issue of the censor's authority to
impose a prior restraint for the protection of the public welfare and not
with the validity of "any statutory standards employed by the censor or
procedural requirements as to the submission of the film." 9 Relying
upon the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,0 the
Court found support for the legitimacy of imposing prior restraints on
expression for the protection of the public welfare.3 1
The most significant crystallization of the prior restraint doctrine
is found in the Supreme Court decisions of Freedman v. Maryland32
and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birminghan.33 Although the former con-
cerned obscenity and the latter was a product of the civil rights move-
ment, each decision was used by Court to firmly establish strict guide-
lines to insure a minimum of interference with first amendment rights.
In Freedman, unlike Time Film Corp.,3' the Court was presented
with the issue of the validity of procedural standards used to implement
a prior restraint on the exhibition of a film. The Court, per Justice
Brennan, first warned that any system of prior restraints or expression
comes to the United States Supreme Court "bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." 3 More particularly, the Court
held that "while the .state may require advance submission of all films
. , to bar all showings of unprotected films. . . only a judicial deter-
mination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression [and] only a procedure requiring a judicial deter-
mination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. '36 Thus, before any
restraint on expression may properly occur, there must be a prompt
adversary hearing initiated by the censoring authority and resulting in
a final judicial determination. 7
29. Id. at 47.
30. 283 U.S. at 715-16. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925),
where the court held that "a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the public welfare."
31. In Near, the Court listed public policy exceptions to the first amendment
protection against prior restraints, including "the primary requirements of decency
[that] may be enforced against obscene publications." 283 U.S. at 716.
32. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
33. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
34. Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
35. 380 U.S. at 57, quoting from Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1962).
36. 380 U.S. at 58.
37. Id. at 59.
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Shuttlesworth8 arose from the refusal of the city of Birmingham
to grant a parade permit to civil rights marchers."9 The city had
adopted an ordinance which permitted the city commission to refuse a
parade permit if, in its judgment, the "public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be
refused."40 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the ordi-
nance as an unconstitutional prior restraint for its failure to have
"narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing author-
ity."41 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, applied the Freedman
requirement of "speedy" judicial review," finding that the entire licens-
ing process should "be handled on an expedited basis so that rights of
political expression will not be lost in a maze of cumbersome and slow-
moving procedures."43
Shuttlesworth is particularly significant in that it dealt with the
issuance of a license. More precisely, the Court held:
Although this Court has recognized that a statute may be enacted which
prevents serious interference with normal usage of streets and parks, ...
we have consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an ad-
ministrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad
criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places.4
Thus, it would appear that the United States Supreme Court has
clearly expressed serious doubt as to the validity of a prior restraint on
any recognized form of expression.
A municipality which desires to curb the proliferation of a class of
expression, such as pornography, is faced with a difficult problem.
Administrative licensing officials must be provided with some objective
guidelines and any determination resulting in a restraint must be pre-
sented by officials for judicial review.
While the practical mechanics of licensing as a method of control
will be discussed infra, one more philosophical question remains to be
answered: What if the judicial determination of obscenity has already
occurred before the licensing authority becomes involved?
38. 394 U.S. 147.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 149-50.
41. Id. at 150-51.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 153, quoting from Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951).
1 138 3:1979 1
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It is established beyond peradventure that once a communication
is determined to be obscene, it no longer retains the protection of the
first amendment." Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that "there
are legitimate State interests in stemming the tide of commercialized
obscenity .. . [and] [t]hese include the interest of the public in. the
quality of life and the total community environment."" Therefore,
where a particular book or film has already been adjudged obscene, it
may be entirely permissible to enjoin its further exhibition.,
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, following this line of reason-
ing, has held that a prior conviction for obscenity serves the same pur-
pose as a pre-restraint judicial determination. In 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop," challenge was made to the city of Athens, Georgia, ordinance
which permitted the mayor and city council to revoke the business
license of a movie theatre operator for violation of a Georgia state law
prohibiting the exhibition of obscene films. Petitioner's challenge was
based on the argument that the ordinance operated as a prior restraint.
The District Court for the Middle District of Georgia" rejected the
claim of prior restraint and, relying on Near v. Minnesota,"0 held that
"a publisher cannot be restrained by a prior order from publishing what
he desires to publish, but [protection against prior restraint] in no sense
exonerates the publisher from liability for what he has published.""1 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals52 affirmed the judgment of the district
court and held that "the revocation of a movie house license upon a
violation of a valid state law or city ordinance forbidding the exhibition
of sexually explicit material does not violate the right of free speech
vouchsafed under the first amendment." 53
Restraint, therefore, is not placed upon the publisher or theatre
operator with respect to what he intends to express, but calls upon him
to account for his past abuses.5 Thus, the use of prior obscenity convic-
tions by civil authorities could become a significant tool in the control
of commercialized obscenity.55
45. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
46. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
47. Id.
48. 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975).
49. 362 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
50. 283 U.S. 697.
51. 362 F. Supp. at 1396.
52. 482 F.2d at 281.
53. Id.
54. 362 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
55. But see Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374
Control of Adult Entertainment 139 1I 3:1979
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3. THE LICENSING POWER
All businesses, however designated, are subject to the reasonable
exercise of a state's police power through licensing."6 That is, the right
to engage in any commercial enterprise is subordinate to the public
welfare, as determined by the legislature, and even uncompensated obe-
dience to this authority is not a deprivation of property without due
process of law. 7 It appears, therefore, that no vested right exists in a
licensee which is superior to the police power of local governments.8
In addition, the equal protection clauses of the United States and
Florida constitutions do not forbid reasonable classifications. Under the
United States Constitution, the fourteenth amendment is violated only
if the classification rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the government's objective. Florida law permits classification
made on a "reasonable basis" and taking account of "real differences
of practical conditions."5 Thus, the legislative authority may give
groups of persons certain rights or burdens not given to others so long
as there is a reasonable basis for the dichotomy."0
Implicit in the power to grant licenses is the power to deny an
application or to revoke an existing license when the licensee has com-
mitted acts in direct conflict with matters regulated through exercise of
the police power." While the revocation procedure must comply with
the essentials of due process and equal protection, such a procedure has
been recognized, by at least one Florida court, as an appropriate method
of preserving the public order. 2 The United States Supreme Court has
held that where licensing and first amendment freedoms collide:
I) There must be definite, narrow, distinct guidelines for the licensing
authority;
A.2d 502, 504 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (holding a "denial of a license because of
prior obscenity convictions constitutes an impermissible prior restraint").
56. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
57. Id. at 559. The Florida Supreme Court has used this concept several times.
See, e.g., Golden v. McCarthy, 337 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1976) (regulation of tattooing
licenses).
58. See E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26.81 (3d ed. 1978).
59. See Chandler Services, Inc. v. Florida City, 202 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1967).
60. See Florida Sugar Distributors, Inc. v. Wood, 135 Fla. 126, 184 So. 641 (Fla.
1938).
61. MCQUILLAN, supra note 58, at § 26.80.
62. See Vicbar v. City of Miami, 330 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976).
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2) A prompt judicial determination must occur as to whether the sub-
ject speech falls within the protection of the Constitution; and
3) The burden of initiating such procedures must be borne by the
licensing authority. 3
The federal courts have considered these principles as they apply
to adult entertainment licensees on several occasions, with little agree-
ment among the circuits. In fact, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
appears to stand alone among the federal courts in permitting revoca-
tion of a book store or movie license on the basis or prior convictions
for obscenity. 4
Among the decisions most frequently cited by advocates of unre-
stricted adult entertainment is Avon 42nd Street Corp. v. Meyerson."s
In this challenge to a New York City ordinance concerning a motion
picture theatre license revocation procedure, the district court found
that the law lacked sufficient precise guidelines to restrict the discretion
of the administration in regulating licenses and, further, that revocation
of a movie house license on the basis of a past conviction for obscenity
constituted an invalid prior restraint."6
The court expressed concern that revocation of a license on the
basis of past speech which was unprotected will inevitably result in a
restraint on protected speech. That is, protected speech and obscenity
are often separated by "a dim and uncertain line" 7 and require
"sensitive tools"88 to be used in delineating this line. In addition, the
court also relied in large part on Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen 9 to
support its disapproval of license revocation where it was held that
suppression of a publication because of past offenses "is the essence of
censorship.""
63. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 and text accompanying notes 32 through 43 supra.
64. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 and text accompanying note 48
supra. For the proposition that such licenses cannot constitutionally be suspended for
prior convictions on matters of obscenity, see Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark,
supra note 55.
65. 352 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
66. Id. at 999.
67. Id. at 997, citing the language of the Supreme Court in Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1962).
68. Id., citing the language of the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525 (1958).
69. 283 U.S. 697.
70. 352 F. Supp. at 998, discussing the holding of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
Control of Adult Entertainment 141 1I 3:!979
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This is not to say, however, that the court failed to recognize the
power of municipalities to "validly regulate and license motion picture
theatres on the basis of public health and safety by a narrowly drawn
ordinance."7 The court's concern was that terms such as "character,"
"decency" or "public morality," failed to meet the definite standards
required in Freedman72 and Shuttlesworth73
While the A von decision clearly disapproved of all but the narrow-
est restraints on adult businesses involving print or film media, the fifth
circuit has taken exactly the opposite position in 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop.74 Here, the United States district court75 and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals both found that revocation of a book store or movie
house license on the basis of a past conviction is neither vague for failure
to provide standards nor violative of first amendment as a prior re-
straint.76
In Forsyth, an Athens, Georgia, adult theatre had been convicted
of displaying obscene films. The Athens City Code provided:
Section 417. The Mayor and Council of the City of Athens shall have
the right after notice and hearing to revoke any business license issued
hereunder on the following grounds:
2(b) Violation of a law of the State of Georgia which affects the public
health, safety, and welfare and which violation occurred as a part of the
main business licensed.77
Thus, the Athens ordinance provided a three-element formula to
guide the licensing authority: (1) violation of a valid law; (2) said viola-
tion affects the public health, safety and welfare; and (3) the violation
occurred as a main part of the business licensed; e.g., sale of obscene
materials by the operator of an adult book store or theatre.
In finding these standards sufficiently explicit, the district court
determined that obscenity violations clearly affect the public health,
safety and welfare. Further, the ordinance "sufficiently indicates to both
71. 352 F. Supp. at 999.
72. 380 U.S. 51.
73. 394 U.S. 147.
74. 482 F.2d 280.
75. 362 F. Supp. 1389.
76. 482 F.2d at 281.
77. ATHENS, GA., CODE § 417 (1971), set out in the district court's opinion, 362
F. Supp. at 1393.
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Mayor and any licensee what conduct may result in a revocation." ' The
court went on to note that the revocation procedure does not intend to
restrain the licensee from future publication, but to call upon him to
account for past abuses.79
The dichotomy between the courts would appear to turn on the
perspective given the revocation proceeding. In A von, the court saw the
revocation proceeding as a "sword" aimed at eliminating future expres-
sions of unknown quality and, thus, effectively eliminating the public
commercial forum for adult materials. In Forsyth, however, the court
views the revocation proceeding as a "shield" designed to protect the
public from proven abusers of the rights of free speech.
It is significant to note that, under the Forsyth doctrine, the prob-
lem of judicial determination of obscenity raised in Freedman v.
Maryland0 is absent. The criminal proceeding resulting in the convic-
tion from which the revocation springs is the judicial determination of
obscenity.
In Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade Couny,8 ' a Flor-
78. 362 F. Supp. at 1397.
79. Id. The district court's analysis of the concept of prior restraint is most
significent in that this court and the court in A von, 352 F. Supp. 994, came to opposite
conclusions, each basing its decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697. The Forsyth court placed considerable emphasis on the penalty for
publishing unprotected speech. That is, each person is free to publish without restraint,
but "must take the consequence of (his) own temerity." 362 F. Supp. at 1397. The
Forsyth court saw no prior restraint arising from revocation based on past abuses:
The non-exhibition of films obscene or non-obscene during said period would not
be the result direct or indirect of previous restraint, but would result incidentally
from past abuses of immunity from previous restraint just as a person convicted
and imprisoned for criminal libel might incidentally and indirectly prevented and
thus practically restrained from any and all publications during the period of
incarceration.
362 F. Supp. at 1397.
On the other hand, the A von court viewed Near as an absolute prohibition against
revocation for past abuses. The court looked at revocation as a disabling of the public's
right to view certain films. Further, the Avon decision ignored the reasoning cited in
Forsyth and held that Near would tolerate only fines for abuses of the first amendment.
352 F. Supp. at 998. Such conflicting opinions defy explanation or reconciliation. Until
some higher court addresses these philosophies together, the question will remain sub-
ject to debate.
80. 380 U.S. 51. The doctrine is more fully set forth in the text accompanying
note 63 supra.
81. 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1976), construing DADE COUNTY, FLA.,
ORDINANCE No. 75-50 (1975).
143 I113:1979
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ida case involving a challenge to the Dade County Bingo Ordinance
which provided for revocation of a license if the licensee was convicted
of violating the ordinance, the District Court of Appeal for the Third
District of Florida held that "such a procedure provides the best possible
due process available in our judicial system since the person must be
proved guilty of violating the ordinance beyond a reasonable doubt
instead of a mere preponderance of the evidence, as is the standard in
civil cases.""2
Thus, license revocation appears, at least in a general sense, to be
an efficacious tool in the attempts of municipal governments to stem the
tide of commercialized obscenity.
It should be noted, however, that several state jurisdictions ex-
pressly reject Forsyth3 and that Florida still requires a narrowly drawn
ordinance in those instances where an administrative body is charged
with the power to deny or revoke a license. 4
In Perrine v. Municipal Court,85 the California Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a licensing statute which provided for license
denial based on prior convictions for obscenity. Supporting that hold-
ing, the court concluded that the penalty for violating the obscenity laws
"does not include a forfeiture of First Amendment rights."" Further, it
was held that the fact that the obscenity penalties might be insufficient
to deter future violations cannot justify a prospective forfeiture of those
rights on the theory of prior convictions. 7
The subject ordinance 8 was found invalid for three reasons: (1) An
absence of objective and definite standards for issuance of the license;
(2) The ordinance conditioned issuance of a license upon qualifications
82. Id. at 668. This holding is consistent with Forsyth, 362 F. Supp. 1389, in that
both courts recognize that revocation flowed directly from the conviction. See also
Berman v. City of Miami, 17 Fla. Supp. 72 (C.C.D.C. 1960), affd, 127 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
3rd DCA 1960).
83. Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374 A.2d 502
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash. 2d 747, 505 P.2d 126
(1973); City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 11. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (App. Ct.
1975); Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
84. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
85. 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1038 (1972).
86. 488 P.2d at 653.
87. Id.
88. Los ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY ORDINANCE No. 5860 (1969), more specifically
§ 329.4.
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that allegedly bear no reasonable relationship to the occupation li-
censed; and (3) It is constitutionally impermissible to prohibit a person
from selling books solely on the basis of a past criminal conviction. 9
As to the first reason, there seems to be little debate that definite
guidelines are required to guide any licensing authority in the granting
or denying of an occupational license. Thus, amorphous terms such as
"good character" or "public welfare" are, without more, legally insuffi-
cient. 0 Florida seems to have adopted the same rule.9
As to the second and third grounds, in Perrine, the court was
concerned wiith with the applicability of the standards to the business
of selling books. The court emphatically noted that, unlike doctors,
lawyers and school teachers, sellers of books have no particular profes-
sional demands upon them such that moral character would be rele-
vant.9"
The court went on to note that "sex crimes" are not ordinarily
commited in book stores and, therefore, the standards were overbroad.
Moreover, the court rejected even a nexus between convictions for ob-
scenity and the operation of book stores where obscene materials were
sold, finding revocation on such convictions to be violative of the first
amendment.9 3
89. 488 P.2d at 652.
90. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
91. Vicbar v. City of Miami, 330 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). The Third
District Court of Appeal held that the power of refusal to renew nightclub licenses, when
left in the hands of the city manager, is impermissible unless limited by guidelines
bearing a reasonable relationship to the public health and welfare.
It should be noted, however, that the concept of revocation was notperse unlawful.
Rather, the court expressed understanding for the desires of government officials to
curtail the activities of businesses known to "engender trouble" for law enforcement
authorities and suggested that, given appropriate guidelines, the court had no legal
objection to the vesting of revocation power in the licensing authority.
92. 488 P.2d at 652.
93. Id. The California court's statements concerning crimes is not entirely cor-
rect. While no empirical data exists to show a nexus between pornographic literature
and violent sex crimes, there is clearly a nexus between adult businesses and the crime
of obscenity. The average commercial book store or theatre may occasionally utter
some unprotected speech. An adult business engages in unprotected communication on
a regular basis. Thus, adult businesses do foster frequent violations of the law governing
their business.
The United States Supreme Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, reached another conclusion vis-a-vis the link between obscenity and crime. Rather
than rejecting this possible connection, the court referred to the Hill-Link Report, supra
Control of Adult Entertainment 145 11 3:1979
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This nexus between the crime committed and the trade practiced
has been litigated in a number of jurisdictions. Florida has recognized
that suspension of a professional license may be made for misconduct
which is "malum in se" and thus jeopardizes the interests of the profes-
sion and public it serves.94 Similarly, Florida and other jurisdictions
have upheld license denials and revocations on the basis of past convic-
tions for non-professional trades when some definite standards to con-
trol the discretion of the licensing authority were provided.,
In City of Miami Beach v. Austin Burke, Inc.,9" the Third- District
Court of Appeal held that "merchandising is a lawful business" which
one has an "inherent" right to pursue.9" In contrast, where the business
is not a "lawful business" (e.g., the sale of intoxicating beverages),98
that "right" is reduced to a mere privilege for which such definite
standards are not required.9 The determinant as to whether a business
is lawful or unlawful per se appears to be whether the license is regula-
tory or revenue producing. '
Thus, of vital concern is the status which adult entertainment may
be said to occupy. As obscenity is unprotected speech, a commercial
purveyor of such materials may fairly be said to be engaging in an
"unlawful" business or, at least, possesses no "inherent" right to do so.
While permanent revocation of a non-professional license has been held
invalid and arbitrary, a period of years required between conviction of
note 18, and its suggestion of a correlation between obscenity and anti-social behavior.
413 U.S. at 59.
Whatever socio-psychological conclusions may ultimately be drawn by medical
science, there clearly exists some judicial approval of legislative efforts to link crime
and pornography.
94. Richardson v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1976).
95. See, e.g., State ex rel. Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc. v. Board of Business Regulation,
304 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974); Anderson v. Comm'r. of Highways, 126 N.W.
2d 778 (Minn. 1964); Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962). But see City of
Mesguite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 559 S.W. 2d 92 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1977), where a
licensing ordinance permitting denial of a license to operate vending machines in an
amusement park on the basis of an applicant's "connection with criminal elements" was
struck as constitutionally vague.
96. 185 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1966).
97. Id. at 725.
98. In Florida the sale of intoxicating beverages has been held to be a privilege
and not a right. Id., citing Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
99. 185 So. 2d at 725.
100. 31 So. 2d at 389.
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a crime and issuance of a license has been held to be a valid regulation
designed to eliminate undue prevalence. 10
The California courts are not alone, however, in disapproving this
theory. The PerrineH2 decision was followed by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in a 1975 decision involving revocation of an adult theatre's
occupational license. 103
This city of St. Paul's ordinance04 provided that the city council
could revoke or deny any motion picture theatre license on the ground
that the "licensee, owner, manager, lessee, employee, or financially
interested person" had been convicted of a crime pertaining to the sale,
distribution or exhibition of obscene material relative to the operation
of the movie theatre license.0 5 The St. Paul city council revoked the
plaintiff's license on the basis of a prior conviction.
In striking down the St. Paul ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme
Court specifically found that motion picture theatres are engaged in
activity protected by the first amendment and any licensing power is
subordinate to those constitutional dictates. 0 The court specifically
rejected an analogy between obscene books and businesses, such as
massage parlors or liquor stores and the concept of "unlawful" versus
"lawful and ordinary" business, on the ground that massage parlors
enjoy no first amendment protection.107 Referring to Near v.
Minnesota,0 8 the court held that the proper remedy is not in suppression
but in criminal prosecutions. Further, the court stated: "The risk that
criminal sanctions will be insufficient to deter future violations of the
ordinance cannot justify the city's attempt to revoke plaintiff's license
in the face of his right to the free speech guaranty of the first amend-
ment."' 0
This holding was also followed by the District Court of Appeals of
Illinois."0 The ordinance in question permitted the mayor to revoke any
101. 185 So. 2d at 725.
102. Note 84 and accompanying text supra.
103. Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 201, 227 N.W. 2d 370 (1975).
104. ST. PAUL LEGISLATIVE CODE, § 372.04(G) (1974).
105. 227 N.W. 2d at 371.
106. Id. at 372-73.
107. Id.
108. 283 U.S. 697.
109. 227 N.W. 2d at 373.
110. City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 111. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (3rd DCA
1975).
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occupational license "for good and sufficient cause.""'  Finding this
definition to be unduly vague, the court held that permitting revocation
on such terms creates a "danger of unduly suppressing protected expres-
sion.""'
More recently, the Superior Court of New Jersey rejected a New-
ark city ordinance," 3 which based license denial or revocation on past
convictions, for reasons similar to A von' 4 and its progeny. In this case,
a license was refused for the applicant's failure to give full and correct
answers on the license application and because the applicant had been
previously convicted of showing obscene pictures."'
The court found that failure to disclose a 1972 conviction on a
license application, in light of disclosure of more recent convictions, was
an "inconsequential and insufficient" reason to refuse a license.", The
court was silent, however, as to what effect a total failure to reveal past
convictions would have.
As to the free speech issue, the New Jersey court joined Califor-
niay 7 Illinois"' and Minnesota"9 in rejecting the use of license revoca-
tions and called for use of criminal sanctions as the only appropriate
remedy. 20
It would thus appear that the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals stands alone in approving the use of past convictions for license
revocations.' 21 Yet, the division between the jurisdictions is not so clear-
I 1. DELEVAN, ILL., ORDINANCE No. 73-6 § 12 (1973). § 4 of the ordinance made
it unlawful to "offer or present any motion picture or performance which is obscene."
334 N.E. 2d at 191. A finding of obscenity, by the mayor, permitted him to exercise
his revocation powers.
112. 334 N.E. 2d at 192, citing from the Supreme Court decision of Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
113. Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374 A.2d 502
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), discussing NEWARK, N.J., CITY ORDINANCE No. 5: 8-
13(a).
114. 352 F. Supp. 994.
115. 374 A.2d at 503.
116. Id.
117. Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
118. City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 111. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (3rd DCA
1975).
119. Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 201, 227 N.W. 2d 370 (1975).
120. 374 A.2d at 504, citing Alexander, 227 N.W. 2d 370.
121. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1044 (1975).
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cut. In each of the jurisdictions in which licensing-revocation ordinances
were struck down, the courts expressed universal concern over the lack
of definite standards. In the fifth circuit, where this procedure was
approved, the court particularly noted the clarity of the revocation ordi-
nance.12
In the St. Paul ordinance, no legislative effort was made to connect
the conviction with the public health, safety and welfare.12' The Dele-
van, Illinois, ordinance allowed revocation for "good and sufficient
cause," but failed to define that term. 2 Newark's revocation ordinance
permitted a license to be suspended "for the furtherance of decency and
good order," but, again, no definition of decency or good order was
provided by the legislative authority.' 2' Lastly, the Los Angeles ordi-
nance failed to connect the enumerated offenses with the public wel-
fare.'12
In 106 Forsyth,127 however, the Athens, Georgia, ordinance suf-
fered from none of these deficiencies. It required a single standard
conviction; that the conviction be deleterious to the public welfare; and
a showing that the conviction arose from the operation of the licensed
business.' 2'
It may reasonably be said that a revocation ordinance is not per se
unconstitutional; rather, that in light of first amendment rights, there
exists a heavy presumption against its constitutionality which can be
overcome if sufficient objective standards exist to guide the licensing
authority. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in 1947:
It has been indicated that a mere lodging of discretion in public officers
or bodies to judge the fitness and character of applicants for licenses,
permits, etc., does not vest arbitrary power in such officials, but rather
calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature for which no
definite rule of action is necessary.' 21
122. Id. at 283.
123. 227 N.W. 2d at 373.
124. 334 N.E. 2d at 191.
125. 374 A.2d at 503.
126. 488 P.2d at 650.
127. 362 F. Supp. 1389.
128. Id. at 1393.
129. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
13:1979 149 I1
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4. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A collateral issue in the revocation of occupational licenses as a
result of criminal convictions is the problem of double jeopardy.10 That
is, in addition to whatever criminal penalty attached to the conviction,
it has been argued that the license revocation is unlawful as a second
punishment for the same offense.
Perhaps the strongest expression of this double jeopardy argument
is found in the Washington Supreme Court decision of City of Seattle
v. Bittner.'M The court presumed that persons convicted of obscenity
violations had paid the prescribed penalty provided by law for that
offense. In mixing this presumption with the doctrine of prior restraint,
the court held:
The Appellant (City of Seattle) has apparently proceeded upon the as-
sumption that a person who has been convicted of the offense of exhibit-
ing an obscene movie . . . is more likely than not to commit the offense
again. This must mean in its opinion, the imposition of penalties under
the criminal law has neither a deterrent nor a rehabilitative effect, and
further that the penalties prescribed are not adequate punishment for the
offense. Whether or not this assumption has any validity, we are con-
vinced that the constitution does not permit a licensing agency to deny
to any citizen the right to exercise one of his fundamental freedoms on
the ground that he has abused that freedom in the past.3 2
Florida, however, has taken the opposite view. Injunctive relief to
prevent future showing of films found to be obscene is not a punitive
measure but a remedial one. 33 Even an acquittal in a criminal pro-
ceeding is not a bar to maintenance of the injunctive proceedings. 34
Further, because judgments in criminal actions are inadmissible in Flor-
ida to prove facts in a civil action, 3 1 the identity of issues and claims
is absent and thus res judicata will not apply.
In essence, the civil penalty which flows from an obscenity convic-
tion is not aimed primarily at the offender. Rather, it is merely a mea-
130. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy for life and limb."
131. 81 Wash. 2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973).
132. 505 P.2d at 131.
133. State ex rel. Gerstein v. Walvick Theatre Corp., 298 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla.
1974).
134. Id.
135. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
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sure of protection for the public. The Florida Supreme Court, in approv-
ing revocation of a dental license for drug abuse violations, held that
acts done in "persistent disregard" of the law: "offend generally ac-
cepted standards of conduct within the profession thereby jeopardizing
the interests of the profession and the public it serves.'""
5. ZONING
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court recognized that local
zoning ordinances represent a valid exercise of a state's police power.37
There it was argued that, where such ordinances are designed to pro-
mote public health, safety, welfare and morals, the individual's right
must give way to the particular concern of the community. 3 '
More recently, the Supreme Court applied these general zoning
principles to adult entertainment. In Young v. American Mini
Theatres,' the Court approved a Detroit city ordinance' which re-
quired a specified distance between buildings housing adult theatres.
The decision is significant for several reasons. First, the Detroit
ordinance was approved despite the fact that it singled out a particular
type of activity as a "regulated use.""'' Secondly, the ordinance was
found not to have an impermissible deterrent effect on first amendment
freedoms.' Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Court recog-
nized a legitimate governmental interest, through its licensing and zon-
ing power, sufficient to regulate the use of commercial property for the
benefit of urban preservation.'43
In setting apart adult theatres as "regulated uses," the Detroit
ordinance defined such theatres as ones in which the material presented
was "characterized by an emphasis" on matter depicting or relating to
"specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas."'4
The Court held such classifications were not void for vagueness. As
to the "characterized by an emphasis" language, the Court held that a
136. Richardson v. State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231, 233 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976).
137. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
138. Id. at 373.
139. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
140. DETROrr, MICH., CITY ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.000 (1972).
141. 427 U.S. at 62.
142. Id. at 60.
143. Id. at 71.
144. Id. at 53.
151 1
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theatre owner whose "regular fare" involved sexually oriented materials
was clearly on notice as to what was expected."' Further, the 1000 foot
distance requirement between regulated uses was not unconstitutional,
in that it was found not to be a regulation of speech on the basis of its
content, but: "Rather, it is a regulation of the right to locate a business
based on the side effects of its location. The interest in preserving neigh-
borhoods is not a subterfuge for censorship." '
What seemed of greatest importance to the Court was the fact that
this zoning law did not constitute a prior restraint on the first amend-
ment rights of the licensees. There was no claim made by the theatre
owners that they were "denied access to the market" nor that the mar-
ket denied access to them. The mere fact that the commercial exploita-
tion of material was subject to zoning and the licensing requirement was
held not to be a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.4 7
The Court also recognized the city's interest in planning and regu-
lating the use of property for commercial purposes even to the extent
that different classifications existed for adult theatres.14 To support this
holding, the Court referred to those prior instances where the content
of the speech determined its level of constitutional protection.
For example, it has been held that a public rapid transit system
may accept some advertisements and reject others;'" that a state may
properly limit highway billboards to neighborhood businesses;,-" that a
regulatory commission may prohibit businesses from making state-
ments which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive.'5, Thus, the
measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech
will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication.
In recognizing a distinction between adult expression and philo-
sophical or political oratory, the Court noted:
145. Id. at 58-59.
146. Id. at 57, n. 15, citing the dissenting opinion in American Mini Theatres v.
Gribbs, 518 F. 2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1975), the lower appellate decision to the present case.
The Supreme Court did, in fact, embrace this thought in its decision by stating that the
ordinance was justified "by the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighbor-
hoods." 427 U.S. at 71.
147. 427 U.S. at 62.
148. 1d. at 62-63.
149. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
150. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1968).
151. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
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It is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type (adult material)
of expression is of a wholly different and lesser magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate. . .. Even though the First Amend-
ment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold
that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the
basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion
pictures.'
Lastly, the Court ruled that its function did not include an appraisal
of the wisdom of the Detroit city government's desire to enact separate
treatment for adult theatres. Rather, the city's interest in attempting to
preserve the quality of urban life is one deserving of high respect and
the city. must therefore be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
"experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."'
The Mini-Theatres decision can be constrasted with the Supreme
Court's rejection of a Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance' which prohib-
ited nudity on outdoor theatre screens. That enactment was struck down
because it failed to explain how flashes of nudity, without regard to their
erotic purpose, could be any more distracting to traffic than non-
obscene material. In so holding, the Court noted that the presumption
of validity generally accorded statutes has less force when a classifica-
tion turns on the subject matter of expression.'
In the fifth circuit, a zoning ordinance was recently struck down
for going beyond the limitations set forth in the Mini-Theatres deci-
sion.' Here, the city of Baton Rouge adopted a resolution withholding
the certificate of occupancy from an adult book store, based on the
content of its product. The city attempted to defend this resolution on
the same basis set forth by the appellant in Mini-Theatres; that is, that
a city may provide that certain establishments shall operate only in
specified neighborhoods. " However, the court rejected this argument
because the "zoning" resolution was retroactive and piecemeal, thus
making it a "highly suspect" act.' The court held that "zoning...
connotes a non-particularized legislative process in which rules are pro-
152. 427 U.S. at 70.
153. Id. at 71.
154. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
155. Id. at 215.
156. Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 1175.
158. 563 F.2d at 1175, citing Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge,
309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La. 1975).
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mulgated and land areas are designated on a general, prospective
basis." ' 9 In essence, the court found that resolutions aimed at individual
businesses, even if delineated as zoning enactments, fail to meet consti-
tutional standards in that restrictions must be" 'no greater than neces-
sary or essential to the protection of the governmental interests.' "I"
A somewhat different approach to zoning regulations was adopted
by the city of Boston in 1974.111 Rather than attempt to regulate adult
entertainment locations by dispersing them throughout particular zon-
ing classifications, the city set aside a specific geographical area, dubbed
the "combat zone," for "adult entertainment," in an effort to concen-
trate such businesses and enhance enforcement activities.' This area
became the exclusive location within the city where adult entertainment
would be permitted. Upon the passage of the enabling legislation, all
Adult Entertainment Uses, formerly classified as "Conditional," be-
came "Prohibited" outside the zone.
The zone concept, however, has proven unsatisfactory. In practical
effect, the vices contained within the zone continue to spill over to the
surrounding community. Of particular concern to law enforcement offi-
cials has been the significant increase in violent crimes, including mur-
der.'1 By 1977, the Boston model was being shunned in favor of the
Detroit spacing model.' In fact, Boston city planners are considering
the tearing down of the combat zone and its re-classification as a more
conventional commercial district.
159. 563 F.2d at 1175.
160. Id. at 1175-76, citing Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). The Watts court also relied here in part
on Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977).
Recently, in Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla.
1978), a Jacksonville, Florida, zoning ordinance was struck down because it was found
to have violated the parameters set down in Young. See note 139 and accompanying
text supra. More particularly, the ordinance impermissibly resulted in the total exclu-
sion of adult businesses. In so doing, the Jacksonville zoning law failed to survive the
close scrutiny ascribed to enactments which affect free expression. 450 F. Supp. at 702-
03.
161. BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 3-1 (1974).
162. STAFF DRAFT, PLANNING FOR DOWNTOWN ENTERTAINMENT DISTRICT,
STUDY DESIGN OF THE BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY (November 26, 1973).
163. Gumpert, Problems in the Combat Zone, Wall St. J., June 30, 1977.
164. See note 140 and accompanying text supra, which deal with the Detroit
model.
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6. NUISANCE
"The nuisance doctrine operates as a restriction upon the right of
[an] owner of property to make such use of it as he pleases;"' 65 the
doctrine will not be invoked so long as this use does not interfere with
the rights of his neighbors to use their property.' More specifically, the
term applies to a "class of wrongs which arises from . . . unlawful use
by a person of his property which produces . . . material damage:"
generally, the diminution of the value or usefulness of the property
surrounding the nuisance." 7
Of particular concern is this inquiry: Does the maintenance of a
"common" or "public nuisance" constitute an act which injuriously
affects the safety, health, welfare or morals of the public? A public
nuisance must arise from an unlawful act and, therefore, its existence
is generally considered a question of law."'
As related to obscenity, the nuisance theory has been successful
with regard to specific films or books, but is generally rejected as a
blanket restraint on a class of activities.
In 1957, the Supreme Court of New Mexico prohibited the state
from relying on a nuisance abatement statute in its criminal prosecution
of a motion picture theatre owner.6 9 First, the court held that applying
the statute to enjoin the theatre owner would result in a violation of his
due process rights. The state's case rested solely on the term "lewdness"
found in the statutory language and the court determined that that term
was impermissibly "too vague and indefinite" to support the state's
action. 170 Then , in response to the state's assertion that injunctive relief
could be sought by invoking the trial court's "general equity powers for
165. '58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 1 (1971); see Reaver v. Martin Theatres of
Florida, Inc., 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951).
166. See Palm Corp. v. Waiters, 148 Fla. 527, 4 So. 2d 696 (1941).
167. 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 1 (1971).
168. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 8 (1971).
169. State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957).
170. 317 P.2d at 320. The court offered additional support for its belief that the
term "lewdness" in the New Mexico statute could not be relied upon to enjoin the owner
from showing obscene films. The statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis was
applied when the court noted that the term "lewdness" was followed in the statute by
the words "assignation or prostitution." " 'Under this rule, general terms in a statute
may be regarded as limited by subsequent more specific terms.'" Thus, the court's view
was that the legislature intended that the proscribed "lewdness" refer only to acts of
"assignation or prostitution" and not to the showing of obscene films in theatre estab-
lishments as well. 317 P.2d at 319, citing to 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 249 (1944).
Control of Adult Entertainment 155 11 3:1979
25
Knox and Klausner: Municipal Regulation Of "Adult Entertainment"- The Game Without R
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
protection of public morals," the New Mexico court stated that it would
be prejudicial to the owner to permit a "civil action" such as that to be
introduced into a criminal proceeding brought under a criminal statute
and complaint.17 1
In 1968, the Michigan Supreme Court sustained the use of a munic-
ipal licensing ordinance to avert the "nuisance" caused by a drive-in
movie screen visible to children in residential areas.17 Township officials
had denied the theatre owner's application for license renewal and he
filed suit. In rejecting the owner's first and fourteenth amendment argu-
ment, the court held that the right of free speech did not include the right
to force material "not fit to be seen by children" on the "children of
parents who are unwilling to have [that] done ...."I"
That same year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a substan-
tially more restrictive view of nuisance proceedings.174 The court rejected
injunctions issued after ex-parte hearings on complaints of the district
attorney. Instead, the court held that no such injunctions may issue
without a prompt, adversarial hearing resulting in a judicial determi-
nation of obscenity, as required by Freedman v. Maryland.'75
In 1971, a Louisiana Court of Appeals raised a unique due process
argument vis-a-vis the closure of a business premises for maintenance
of the nuisance of obscenity. 7 ' The court found unconstitutional that
portion of an injunction which prohibited any use of the building in
which the nuisance occurred. It was reasoned that an "unknowing and
unparticipating" property owner could be deprived of the use of his
property and that judicial policy against prior restraint forbade injunc-
tion of publications not contained in the nuisance category. Thus, the
maximum injunction permissible was prohibition of "permitting the
continued existence of the nuisance."'' 78
In 1971, an Ohio Court of Appeals rejected challenge to an Ohio
171. 317 P.2d at 321.
172. Bloss v. Paris Township, 380 Mich. 466, 157 N.W. 2d 260 (1968).
173. Id. at 261, 263. The court noted that the theatre owner admitted on the stand
and in his newspaper advertisements that the movies shown at his theatre were "not fit
to be seen by children below 18 years of age." Id. at 261.
174. Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 45 (1968).
175. Id. at 48. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 and 63 supra.
176. Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876 (Ct. App.
La. 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 158 (1972), appeal dismissed, 273 So. 2d 653 (1973).
177. 255 So. 2d at 881.
178. Id.
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nuisance statute in State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch."'' The
appellate court had examined a particular film and, having found it to
be obscene upon applying the tests set forth in Roth v. United States'89
and A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Plea-
sure" v. A tty General of Massachusetts,' also found it to be a nuis-
ance. 82 Thus judged as an obscene film, the appellate court held it to
be outside the penumbra of the first amendment's protection. Therefore,
held the court, the injunctive relief granted by the trial court under the
Ohio nuisance abatement statute was not violative of the first amend-
ment.' u
In 1974, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a motion to certify which
"removed the issue of obscenity from [the] case," leaving the court to
rule on the constitutionality of the Ohio nuisance abatement statute.'84
Although theatre owners who had been enjoined from showing the
movie "Without a Stitch" made repeated attacks on the statute, it was
upheld."" To their dismay, the court found that, despite the fact that the
nuisance abatement statute was directed toward enjoing the exhibition
of obscene "films" (in the plural), "the statute was broad enough to
include the exhibition of a single obscene film, which is composed of a
number of film positives," as are all motion pictures. 8 The court found
valid the statute's procedural sections under which temporary and per-
manent injunctions had been issued. Those sections passed the
Freedman v. Maryland8' test in that they allowed the issuance of injunc-
tions only after full judicial adversary hearings on the allegation of
obscenity.'s The court rejected the theatre owners' argument that the
statute was "overbroad" because it provided that "any place which
exhibits filmed obscenity" is a "nuisance."'8 9 The court also rejected
the theatre owners' contention that the statutory scheme was
179. 28 Ohio App. 2d 107, 276 N.E. 2d 655 (Ct. App. 1971), modified, 307 N.E.
2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
180. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
181. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
182. 276 N.E. 2d at 660.
183. Id. at 657.
184. State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E. 2d
911, 913 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
185. 307 N.E. 2d at 917-18.
186. Id. at 913.
187. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 and 63 supra.
188. 307 N.E. 2d at 914.
189. Id. at 915.
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"unconstitutionally deficient" because it failed to require scienter, i.e.,
knowledge on the part of the nuisance abatement defendants, as to the
content of the film. Although the court agreed that such knowledge is
constitutionally required, it noted the statute did, in fact, require scien-
ter, but that the theatre owners failed to assert lack of knowledge in
their first appeal.190 The court further determined that, in accordance
with the general rule, the burden of proof under the nuisance statute lay
with the complainant, even when the statute itself fails to address the
issue.'9' Among the statutory remedies upheld was a one year closing
of the theatre "in and upon which the nuisance was maintained ....19
That remedy received judicial approval because the statute provided
that, through compliance with certain prescribed measures, the theatre
owner could avoid a closure of the premises. Before giving its approval
to the closure avoidance requirements, the court scrutinized each ele-
ment to determine if any one posed "an unconstitutional prior restraint
on an activity generally protected by the first amendment."" 3 Even the
requirement that the theatre owner demonstrate "that he will prevent
...the [future] exhibition of the particular film declared obscene" was
held not to be a "prior restraint,""' 4 although the court did observe that
it would have struck a statute whose language required an owner to
show that "no film to be exhibited during the one year period will be
obscene.""15
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again revisited
the issue of closing premises and the problems of prior restraint in 1977.
In Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance"' a split court reversed a
district court decision which had invalidated a Texas nuisance abate-
ment statute."97 In upholding the provision, the court found that a pro-
prietor enjoined under the statute was:
prohibited only from doing that which he could not lawfully do anyway,
since Texas law prohibits him from commercially exhibiting, possessing
for sale, or distributing obscene material, Tex. Penal Code Ann.
743.23(a)(1) (1974). A lawful injunction subjects him to no further guess-
190. Id. at 916.
191. Id.




196. 559 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1977).
197. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4667(a)(3) (Vernon 1976).
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work, in determining what is and is not prohibited, than he must already
engage in merely to comply with Texas law.'" In short, as we read the
Texas statutes, they authorize restraint of such expression only as is not
constitutionally protected and is prohibited by State law. This is not the
stuff of which First Amendment violations are made.'"
This holding was, however, expressly rejected in 1978 by a United
States district court in North Carolina."' In rejecting a state nuisance
abatement statute, the court found that the fifth circuit had ignored the
prior restraint issue. That is, the abatement injunction was held to have
the effect of prohibiting future speech of an unknown quality because
of a past abuse of the first amendment.201 Although the fifth circuit
decision relied on Forsyth22 the North Carolina decision relied on
Nebraska Free Press Association v. Stuart,2"3 for the proposition that:
A criminal penalty .,. . is subject to. the whole panoply of protections
afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of
appellate review have been exhausted. Only after judgment has become
final, correct or otherwise, does the law's sanction become fully operative.
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition has an immediate and
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil
sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at
least for the time.204
In essence, the North Carolina district court saw any injunction
which went beyond specific named books or films to be an impermissi-
ble restraint.05 The fifth circuit, by contrast, felt that any purveyor of
adult materials was always running the risk of violating the obscenity
laws.2 "
198. 559 F.2d at 1292, n. 11, which states: "Under Texas law the injunctive order
must 'be specific in terms' and 'describe in reasonable detail. . . the act or acts sought
to be restrained . . .' Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. An order which enjoins the exhibition of
obscene material, as the term is defined in the Penal Code, and provides no further
guidelines is invalid under Texas Rule 683 ... "
199. 559 F.2d at 1292.
200. Felhaber v. North Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. N.C. 1978).
201. Id. at 138.
202. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1044 (1975). See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 supra.
203. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
204. 445 F. Supp. at 139-40, citing 427 U.S. at 559.
205. 445 F. Supp. at 140.
206. 559 F.2d at 1292.
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Therefore, an injunction to abate certain unlawful activity as a
nuisance subjected the book store or theatre owner to "no further guess-
work, in determining what is and is not prohibited, than he must already
engage in merely to comply with [the] law."2 7
Florida's state courts have rejected blanket injunctions against ob-
scene materials on a nuisance theory, approving such procedure only
when specific films were considered."'~ The California Supreme Court,
in a lengthy 1976 decision, joined the ranks of those states disapproving
blanket injunctions.219 In essence, the court adopted the theory that
enjoining the, distribution of unknown material in the future, without a
prior determination of obscenity, is violative of the first amendment
proscription on prior restraint.210
In its most recent session, the Florida Legislature adopted a statute
providing that any places where obscene materials are illegally kept are
a public nuisance.' Further, drive-in theatres are prohibited from dis-
playing films depicting nudity in a manner harmful to minors, where the
film is visible from the public streets. 12
As yet, this statute is untested, but its validity will in large part rely
on the fifth circuit's disposition of Vance, which was ordered heard en
banc in December, 1977.213 If the fifth circuit follows the national trend,
207. Id.
208. Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1971); Paris
Follies, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972); See
Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 359 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978).
209. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600 (1976), in which the court held that any injunction must be
"directed to particular books or films already adjudicated obscene." 130 Cal. Rptr. at
337.
210. 130 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
211. FLA. STAT. § 823.13(l) (1978).
212. Id.
213. The en banc decision was rendered on December 18, 1978. In an 8-6 decision
(one judge not participating) the Court of Appeals overturned the three judge decision
found at 559 F.2d 1286.
The court, per Judge Thornberry, found that the one year closure requirement of
the Texas nuisance statute was unconstitutional as applied to obscenity. In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked primarily to Near v. Minnesota, note 24 and accompanying
text supra, for the proposition that the closure requirement would be an impermissible
prior restraint on future and, thus, presumptively protected speech. The dissent sought
to distinguish the case on its facts, but cited no new precedents.
This case is significant in that it represents a change in fifth circuit thinking. The
Vance decision brings the fifth circuit more in line with its sister courts in taking a
restrictive view of prior restraints.
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then nuisance proceedings resulting in business closures will cease to be
a viable alternative for control of adult materials.
7. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
The simplest method of controlling obscenity is vigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal laws prohibiting the distribution of such materials.
Yet; such a control device also possesses the greatest potential for abuse.
It is axiomatic that protection of the public from illegal activity is
a pioper purpose for the exercise of the police power.21' Furthermore,
businesses which are susceptible to the opportunity for criminal activity
are "fit subjects" for strict regulation.215
A United States district court has held, however, that overly zeal-
ous enforcement of the law can reach the proportion of an impermissible
prior restraint. In Bee See Books v. Leary, the court was faced with
considering the legality 'of a police program of stationing officers in
adult book stores. The court found such activity to have effected a prior
restraint in that it suggested the materials in the stores were unlawful
and inhibited customers from exercising their right of free expression.2 ,
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a simi-
lar conclusion in a case involving the repeated filing of obviously spu-
rious criminal complaints. 21 The local police had initiated over one
hundred prosecutions against a single corporation, despite the fact that
each of the first eleven complaints had resulted in acquittals. Relying
on the precedent set in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,219 the court held: "In the
vital area of First Amendment rights, it is just as easy to discourage
exercise of them by abusing a valid statute as by using an invalid one."220
Most recently, a federal district court in South Florida considered
The unanswered question is the effect of this decision on 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop, notes 48 through 54 and accompanying text supra. Forsyth permitted the revo-
cation of occupational licenses based on past obscenity convictions. Presumably, this
question will be answered at some future time. Pending that resolution, however, the
status of prior restraint in the licensing field will remain unsettled.
214. Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1976).
215. Tally v. City of Detroit, 54 Mich. App. 328, 220 N.W. 2d 778 (Ct. App.
1974).
216. 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
217. Id. at 624.
218. Kram v. Graham, 461 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972).
219. 118 U.S. 356 (1896).
220. 461 F.2d at 707.
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the problem of selective enforcement as it affects adult businesses. In
P.A.B., Inc. v. Stack,22 the court issued a restraining order against the
Fort Lauderdale police and Broward County Sheriff's Office in response
to their concentrated efforts against an adult book store. Here, as in Bee
See Books,z2 the police stationed uniformed officers in front of the book
store on a regular basis, frequently had undercover agents in the store,
checked the identification of patrons seeking to enter and exit the
premises and regularly checked employee identification.2 The court
specifically found, based in part on admissions by the Sheriff in a televi-
sion interview, that the enforcement drive was aimed at causing finan-
cial damage to the store. This pattern of conduct was found to "go
beyond that necessary to enforce criminal obscenity laws" and to "chill"
protected first amendment rights.2u The court stated:
In the area of sexually oriented literature and films, state prosecuting
authorities may vigorously enforce obscenity laws where the purpose is
to punish the promotion or sale of obscene material or to deter such
promotion or sale. However, such law enforcement will run afoul of the
Constitution if it is to force a sexually oriented enterprise to cease doing
business or to refrain from dealing in presumably protected sexually
oriented materials. In those circumstances, such activity constitutes an
invalid restraint on First Amendment rights.m
Where first amendment rights are not directly jeopardized, the
standard for selective enforcement becomes proportionately lighter. In
1976, the city of San Antonio, Texas, adopted an ordinance26 regulating
massage parlors which, in part, required each operator to record the
name, age and current address of each patron together with the date and
the name of the masseur. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
rejected an "associational freedom" challenge to that code provision,2n
finding that massage is not protected by the first amendment. 221 In
making that finding, the court relied on Paris Adult Theatre I v.
221. 440 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
222. 291 F. Supp. 662.
223. 440 F. Supp. at 940.
224. Id. at 944.
225. Id. at 945.
226. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CITY CODE, Chapter 18, Art. IV (1976).
227. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Bayside
Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978), discussed more fully at
note 160 supra.
228. 578 F. 2d at 1015.
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Slaton,221 where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right
of adults to view obscenity in the home extended to willing customers
in commercial theatres:
Even assuming that petitioners have vicarious standing to assert potential
customers' rights, it is unavailing to compare a theatre, open to the public
for a fee, with the private home of Stanley v. Georgia and the marital
bedroom of Griswald v. Connecticut. This Court has, on numerous occa-
sions, refused to hold that commercial ventures such as a motion picture
house are 'private' for the purpose of civil rights litigations and civil rights
statutes. 23
The level of interference tolerated from law enforcement officials
is thus directly related to the quality of the expression. That is, the
further an activity strays from "pure speech" toward conduct, the less
stringent the test for regulation.
8. CONCLUSION
Because of the nature of the media in which "obscene materials"
may appear (motion pictures and books), local governments encounter
formidable constitutional obstacles in their attempts to regulate the
distribution of these items. The United States Supreme Court appears
reluctant to authorize procedures which would have a "chilling effect"
upon the distribution of "legitimate" materials through the same media.
The Court's dilemma appears to rise out of a concern for the
fundamental rights of individuals and an equally profound recognition
of the compelling interests of the states in protecting the health, safety,
welfare and morals of their citizens. The constitutional problems are
further compounded by the existence of competing policy considerations
in interpreting the constitution as it relates to obscenity.
Is the regulation of obscenity a sword to be used against the exer-
cise of individuals' rights to distribute books and films or a shield to
protect the public from being exposed to those materials which may be
offensive to their sense of morality? The resolution of this question, it
appears, would depend upon whether states are empowered to determine
what is "good" for their citizens and, more importantly, whether the
states and their subdivisions may eliminate .what they determine to be
"bad."
229. Id. at 1016, citing to Paris, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
230. Id.
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The courts are divided as to whether the states may be parens
patriae to adults as well as to minors. Many courts appear to have
decided that the states must protect their citizens from themselves, by
ensuring that access to obscene materials is made difficult by strict
regulations, while other courts have decided that unless there is a de-
monstrably compelling state interest in regulating the distribution of
obscene materials-this interest to have been judicially legitimated as
to each piece of questionable material-then the right must be unim-
paired by regulatory processes.
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